Table of Contents
Somalia’s electoral debate and elite power struggles have reached a critical point. With the constitutional timeline tightening toward mid-May, the country faces a difficult political crossroads between two competing visions: the opposition’s preference for a return to the 4.5 clan-based indirect electoral model and the federal government’s insistence on one-person, one-vote elections. Yet Somalia cannot afford another cycle of deadlock.
The challenge now is not choosing between two absolutes, but building a transitional middle ground that preserves legitimacy, avoids political exclusion, and gradually moves the country toward elections without destabilizing the fragile federal system.
The reality is simple: one-person, one-vote elections are not currently practical in Somalia. The federal government does not control the entire country. Large areas remain under Al-Shabaab influence and the regions of Puntland, Somaliland, and Jubaland are outside federal government’s control. There is neither enough time nor a fully agreed national framework to organize a legitimate nationwide direct election without political agreement.
At the same time, most Somalis do not want and loath the return to the 2022-style 4.5 indirect election model. That process was widely hated across both the opposition and government camps because it was viewed as deeply corrupt and manipulated by political elites. Many Somalis saw it not as a real election, but as a system where parliamentary seats were effectively selected by regional executives and power brokers behind closed doors. Few people want to repeat that experience.
A sustainable compromise therefore requires a hybrid transitional model, one that recognizes current realities and uniquely focused on holding an all-inclusive election model that keeps the fragile federal system together.
One possible middle ground would involve a phased electoral framework built around three principles: expanded participation, negotiated consensus, and a clear democratic transition timetable.
First, Somalia could adopt an expanded indirect election model rather than reverting entirely to the old 4.5 structure. Instead of allowing regional executives to select parliamentarians, the electoral colleges could be significantly broadened. Hundreds of delegates from districts, civil society groups, youth organizations, women’s groups, business communities, and local administrations could participate in selecting members of parliament. This would not be a full direct election, but it would be substantially more inclusive than the 2022 process.
Second, the process must be jointly administered rather than centrally controlled. A neutral national electoral council could be formed, composed of representatives from the federal government, opposition groups, federal member states, and independent Somali civil society figures. Such a body would reduce fears that either side is monopolizing the process. The Council would serve as the ultimate authority and arbiter instead of the regional executives as has been the case in the 2022 indirect model.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, all parties should agree to a binding roadmap toward a realistic time frame, possibly within several months to a year. The current dispute is fueled partly by mistrust. The opposition fears that the government may use the language of democracy to consolidate power and stay on longer, while the government fears that abandoning universal suffrage will damage its reputation permanently. A negotiated roadmap with measurable benchmarks could address both concerns. Those benchmarks should start with the establishment of an independent national electoral council accepted by all stakeholders.
Under such a framework, Somalia would avoid both extremes: neither an immediate, potentially unmanageable direct election nor a complete return to the highly criticized 2022 model.
Equally important is the issue of political trust. Somalia’s electoral crises are rarely only about technical systems; they are fundamentally about confidence between political actors. Without dialogue and compromise, even the best-designed electoral model will struggle to gain legitimacy. The federal government may need to soften its insistence on one person, one vote, while the opposition may want to acknowledge the need for technical extension of current government term to institute a reliable, agreed upon election model.
The country’s political class should also recognize that public frustration is growing. Many Somalis increasingly view elite disputes as disconnected from urgent national priorities such as security, economic recovery, state-building, and current humanitarian emergencies in Somalia. Another prolonged electoral crisis could weaken institutions further and create further insecurity and humanitarian risks to an already vulnerable population.
Somalia’s path forward is therefore unlikely to come through total victory for either side. The most viable solution lies in a negotiated transitional arrangement that expands participation, limits elite domination, and creates a credible bridge toward universal suffrage in the long term, not in the middle of a political crisis.
